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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present our ongoing work to build an ap-
proach to empower users of IoT-based cyber physical sys-
tems to protect their privacy by themselves. Our approach 
allows users to identify the privacy risks involved in sharing 
private data with a data consumer, assess the value of their 
private data based on identified risks and take a pragmatic 
data sharing decision balancing the risks with the benefits 
generated by the sharing. Our approach features a knowl-
edgebase, called the Privacy Oracle, that exploits the power 
of the Semantic Web to determine how raw metadata can 
be combined by data consumers to infer privacy-sensitive 
information as well as the privacy risks associated with the 
disclosure of inferred information.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In today’s world, we progressively find ourselves surrounded 
by new IoT-based cyber-physical systems that silently track 
our activities and collect sensitive information about us. 
Among the most prominent examples, we cite smart en-
vironments (e.g., smart homes and cities), quantified self 
technologies, smart energy meters, etc. While such systems 
promise to ease our lives, they raise major privacy concerns 
for their users, as collected data is often privacy-sensitive, 
such as location of individuals, patients’ vital signs. In this 
work, we address these privacy concerns by proposing a so-
lution that allows users to play a central role in protecting 
their privacy.
Figure 1: User-centred Data Sharing Methodology
This work is motivated by two key observations. First, ex-
isting approaches for privacy protection in IoT-based cyber-
physical systems give users only a passive role in protecting
their privacy [3]. Typically, users are prompted by the sys-
tem to supply their privacy preferences as to who can access
their data and for what purposes, and to accept a privacy
policy referring to their preferences. However, users may not
be aware of the direct and indirect risks associated with the
disclosure of their data to a given entity to correctly specify
their privacy preferences, which can also change depending
on the user’s context. Second, recent studies [2, 1] show that
users are becoming more conscious of their privacy, and tend
to take a pragmatic stance on sharing their private data, i.e.
they would accept to release some of their private data in
exchange for some incentives or services. However, making
a tradeoff between the benefits generated by sharing private
data and associated privacy concerns remains a challenging
task to users [4]. This means that users can play a bigger
role in protecting their privacy, but need assistance to play
that role and to derive value out of their private data.
This work adopts the methodology depicted in Figure 1 to
empower users to protect their privacy by themselves. That
is, users should be enabled, before sharing a private data
item (or a combination thereof) with a data consumer to:
1. Understand the privacy risks involved in that sharing;
2. Assess the value of the data to be shared, based on the
identified privacy risks, and compare it to the potential
benefits generated by the sharing;
3. Negotiate with data consumers to attain a (trade-off)
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed solution
data sharing decision satisfying both parties when con-
flicts happen;
4. Control the data release by applying the necessary
data modification techniques (e.g., anonymization, data
perturbation, modification, etc.) to implement the de-
sired sharing decision.
We present in the following section an approach for em-
powering users to protect their privacy.
2. OUR APPROACH
In this work, we use the terms “data owners” to designate
the users of cyber-physical systems that generate data by in-
teracting with the systems (e.g., occupants of smart homes,
monitored patients, etc.), and “data consumers” to desig-
nate the stakeholders that are interested in collecting and
exploiting the data generated, such as electricity companies
in smart grids, healthcare providers in intelligent healthcare
networks, government agencies, etc.
We also use the term a “privacy risk” to designate a po-
tentially harmful use of a disclosed personal data item that
can be made against the individual, or a harmful effect of
that disclosure. Examples include, loss of the individual’s
job or reputation, unfair discrimination, etc.
We give in Figure 2 an overview of our solution, which we
detail in the following. The Personal Data Vault (PDV) is
a secure private data container that falls under the control
of data owners. Raw data generated by connected things
(IoT objects) are stored within the Personal Data Store
of a PDV before being released to any data consumers. All
data flows between data owners and consumers pass by the
PDVs of data owners.
When a data consumer queries some personal private data
from a data owner (either directly, or by getting the data
owner to use a service/application provided by the data con-
sumer), the PDV processes the received query by carrying out
the following steps (detailed in the following subsections):
2.1 Privacy risks inference
The PDV assesses, through the Privacy Risks Inference
Component (called the Privacy Oracle onwards), the pri-
vacy risks associated with releasing the requested data to a
given data consumer along with their probabilities. Knowing
these privacy risks can help data owners better understand
and evaluate the value and sensitivity of requested data. For
example, granular readings of smart electricity meters can
be analyzed to infer information about the occupants such as
their presence/absence and wake/sleep cycles, the possession
of specific devices (e.g., a medical device), etc. The disclo-
sure of such information could lead to privacy risks such as
being subject to discrimination, surveillance, burglaries, etc.
Furthermore, the fact that data consumers may also have
side information about data owners, or are able to combine
multiple pieces of IoT collected data, can increase their in-
ference capabilities, thus the sphere of possible privacy risks.
For example, a malicious consumer could combine location
data with a user’s vital signs (e.g., heart-rate), to determine
whether the user has an extramarital affair by determining
if the user has a sexual activity outside his dwelling.
The Privacy Oracle (PO) is a knowledgebase that uses
the Semantic Web technologies to determine the implicit in-
formation that can be inferred out of IoT collected data,
along with their associated privacy risks (e.g., discrimina-
tion, surveillance, loss of job, etc.). To do so, the PO models
the following aspects:
• The metadata collected by IoT objects in the consid-
ered smart environment (e.g., location, energy con-
sumption, vital signs, etc.), user’s context as well as
all privacy-sensitive information that can be inferred
along with their associated risks. These data features
are modelled using a domain ontology;
• The inference relationships that exist between collected
metadata and user’s privacy-sensitive information. These
relationships are represented as inference rules (ex-
pressed in a language such as the Semantic Web Rule
Language SWRL).
We present in Figure 3 simplified1 examples of inference
rules. Rule-1 states that the use of a device can be in-
ferred from the readings of an energy smart meter (EMR).
The terms Person, EMR, Device are ontological concepts in
the domain ontology, whereas hasEMR, isShared, useDevice,
isInferrable are properties. Rule-2 states that the use of
a medical device reveals the health conditions for which the
device is used. Rule-1 and Rule-2 can be combined together
to infer the fact that the health conditions could be inferred
from the readings of an energy smart meter. Rule-3 sim-
ply states that location and heart-rate metadata could be
combined to infer if data owner has an extramarital affair
(i.e. heart-rate can be used to infer if data owner is engaged
in a sexual activity, and location can be exploited to infer
whether data owner is in a suspicious location (e.g., out-
side home)). The rule uses contextual information such as
whether the data owner is married.
1For clarity, we omit details such as the certainty of the
inference and the associated inference algorithm.
Rule-1 (Inferring a device usage by Energy Meter Readings EMR): 
Person(?p), hasEMR(?p,?r), EMR(?r), isShared(?r, “true”)  
          useDevice(?p, ?d), Device(?d), isInferrable(?d,“true”)
Rule-2 (Inferring health conditions by a Medical device): 
Person(?p), usesDevice(?p,?r), MedicalDevice(?r), 
cures(?r,?m), disease(?m)  
           hasDisease(?p, ?m)
Rule-3 (Inferring extramarital affairs by location and sexual activity): 
Person(?p), isMarried(?p, “true”) hasASexualActivity (?p,?x), 
isInferable(?x, “true”), hasLocation(?p,?l), isSuspicious(?l, “true”)   
           has(?p, ?f), ExtramaritalAffair(f), isInferable(?f, “true”)
Figure 3: Sample Inference Rules
Privacy experts can supplement the Privacy Oracle with
inference rules representing the capabilities of new data min-
ing algorithms and the possible combinations of metadata.
2.2 Making a pragmatic data sharing decision
The PDV monetizes (i.e. quantifies) the identified privacy
risks and the potential benefits using a numerical model,
through the Trade-off Data Sharing Component (TDS), and
helps data owner take an informed and pragmatic data shar-
ing decision balancing the two. The TDS builds on an exten-
sion of a numerical model that is proposed in [4] to quan-
tify the privacy risks. Figure 4 shows a simplified overview
of our extended model. The value of a private data item
is computed based on factors such as the probability (i.e.
the certainty) of the information that can be inferred out
of the data item, the probability of the consumer misusing
the inferred information (or the trust in data consumer), the
user’s preference (i.e. how sensitive the user considers their
private data to be) and the value of the data item in a free
data market (a reference value). Red pluses (+) and mi-
nuses (−) represent how a factor affects the computation of
its dependent factors. A decision denotes whether the data
item can be shared with the consumer, along with its accu-
racy (i.e. precision). Privacy decisions change the precision
of released data to a level that would avoid the privacy risks
that cannot be taken at the provided benefits.
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Figure 4: Trade-off Decision Model
2.3 Query / Result modification
Finally, the PDV modifies, through the Query/Result Mod-
ification component, the query before being applied to the
personal data store to discard the data items to which the
data consumer is not entitled, and the query’s result to tune
its accuracy before its submission to data consumer.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
We applied our solution to a smart environment for mon-
itoring elderly people. The environment involves wearable
sensors for monitoring several vital signs such as heart rates,
blood pressure, ECG as well as smart objects and sensors
installed in fixed positions of the monitored environment
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Figure 5: Evaluation Architecture
(i.e. a House). Figure 5 shows the implementation architec-
ture. Healthcare providers provide users with personalized
healthcare services by consuming collected data (through
their mobile apps). Data flows between users and data con-
sumers go through the PDV. Figure 6 (Window-1) shows the
user interface of the PDV. Upon the reception of a new data
sharing request, the PDV takes into account the user’s con-
text and her shared data (Window-2) to provide her with
a description of associated privacy risks (Window-3) as well
as a set of recommended actions (Window-4).
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Figure 6: Demonstration Scenario
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented an ongoing work to enable
the users of smart cyber-physical systems to protect their
privacy by themselves. We are currently refining our ap-
proach with pricing models that would fit for various forms
of benefits, e.g., financial, social benefits, etc.
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